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NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTS
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
The plaintiff was injured riding on an amusement device called the
"Bug" operated by the defendant company. The device consists,
broadly, of a train of six cars operated on a circular, undulating track,
so constructed as to provide its patrons with a jerky, jolting ride. The
plaintiff had ridden on the contrivance before, but testified that the jerk
resulting in her injury, was more violent than she had previously experi-
enced. In deciding the validity of a motion for directed verdict by the
defendant, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the evidence was suffi-
cient to go to the jury. Durbin v. The Humphrey Co., 133 Ohio St.
367 (1938).
The majority of the court in rendering its opinion relied upon
Hamden Lodge v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E.
246 (1934), wherein the "scintilla rule" of evidence was abrogated
and the rule adhered to in the principal case, approved. The dissent
concurred on this ground, but raised the question of liability because
of the doctrine of the assumption of risk.
In order to determine whether or not there has been an assumption
of risk, it is necessary to consider the duty owed by the defendant. It
can be laid down as a general rule, that an owner or proprietor of an
amusement device is not the insurer of his patrons' safety. Carlin v.
Smith, 148 Md. 524, 13o Atl. 340, 44 A.L.R. 193 (1925); Shellack
v. Biers, io9 N.J.L. 6I, 16o Ad. 404 (1932). Yet some few courts
have gone to the full length of holding him to the same degree of care
required of a common carrier. Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Go.,
225 Mo. App. I18o, 34 S.W. (2d) 149 (931); Bibeau v. Fred W.
Pearce Corp., 173 Minn. 331, 271 N.W. 374, 61 A.L.R. 1299
(1928); Tenn. St. Fair Assln. v. Hattie Hartman, 134 Tenn. 159,
183 S.W. 735 (1915)- In Lausterer v. Dorney Park Coaster Co.,
IOO Pa. Sup. Ct. 33 (930), it was said, "owners of an amusement
appliance are not deemed common carriers, although under some circum-
stances the degree of care required may be just as high." But the great
weight of authority supports the view that he is bound to exercise only
the degree of care that would be expected of an ordinarily careful and
prudent man under the circumstances. G. A. Boeckling Co. v. Slattery,
26 Ohio App. 261, 16o N.E. 99 (1927); Godfrey v. Conn. Co., 98
Conn. 63, 118 Ad. 446 (1922); Shellack v. Biers, supra.
The courts, in dealing with cases involving amusement devices, have
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not infrequently ignored the question of voluntary assumption of risk,
either because recovery was barred on the ground that there was no neg-
ligence, Denver Park Amusement Co. v. Pflug, 2 Fed. (2d) 961
(C.C.A. 8th, 1924); Fenner v. Atlantic Amusement Co., 84 N.J.L.
691, 87 Ad. 344 (1913), or because of a failure to appreciate the doc-
trine as applicable to a situation of this sort. Eldred v. United Amuse-
ment Co., 137 Ore. 452, 2 Pac. (2d) 1 4 (I931).
Where the doctrine has been considered, certain limitations have
been established as affecting its use. It appears well established that there
is no assumption of risk of dangers which, although inherent in the
sport, are obscure and unobserved. Dahna v. Fun House Co., 204 Iowa
922, 216 N.W. 262 (1927); Tantillo v. Goldstien Bros. Amusement
Go., 248 N.Y. 286, 162 N.E. 82 (1928).
In a like manner, the cases are in accord in refusing to allow the
defense of assumption of risk where the injury resulted from the negli-
gence of the operator or attendant. Connolly v. Palisades Realty Amuse-
ment Co., ii N.J. Misc. 841, 168 Ad. 419 (933); Shankland v.
Morris & Castle Shows, Inc., 4 La. App. 326 (1925); Hays v. Eldora
Amusement Co., 51 Pa. Sup. Ct. 426 (1912). But aside from these
exceptions, there is a line of cases wherein the plaintiff has been deprived
of recovery because he assumed the risk whidh resulted in his injury.
Leading case in the field, and that relied upon by the minority in the
principal case, is Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 250 N.Y.
479, .166 N.E. 173 (1929), wherein Judge Cardozo expresses the
opinion that "one who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that
inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer
accepts the risk of a thrust by his antagonist, or a spectator at a ball game,
the chance of contact with the ball." The view, thus expressed, that
the patron assumes the risk of those dangers which are inherent, obvious
and necessary, is well supported. Myers v. Park Play, Inc., 35 Ohio App.
336, 172 N.E. 394 (1929); Gardner v. G. Howard Mitchell, Inc.,
107 N.J.L. 311, 153 Ad. 607 (193I); Torian v. Parkview. Amuse-
ment Co., 331 MO. 700, 56 S.W. (2d) 134 (1932); Sullivan v.
Ridgeway Constr. Co., 236 Mass. 75, 127 N.E. 543 (1920); Pointer
v. Mountain Ry. Constr. Co., 269 Mo. 104, 189 S.W. 805 (1916).
It is interesting to note that in the case of Lumsden v. Thompson
Scenic Ry. Co., 13o App. Div. (N.Y.) 209 (I909), the plaintiff, a
passenger on a roller coaster, was held to have assumed the risk of being
thrown from the car by its usual operation, whereas it has since been
held on similar fact situation, that the plaintiff could recover under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Bibeau v. Fred W. Pearce Corp., supra;
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Brown v. Winnwood Amusement Co., supra; Ponticonio v. Clark,
95 Cal. App. 162, 272 Pac. 591 (1928). The divergence of these views
is indicative of the attitude of the courts in different jurisdictions. Few
courts have gone as far as did the court in the Lumsden case, yet some
of the language in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., supra, indi-
cates that the same view exists in New York today.
The contention of the minority in the principal case finds support in
Myers v. Park Play, Inc., supra, which is the only Ohio case directly in
point. The court in that case, applied the doctrine of assumption of risk
with respect to an amusement device known as the "Dodgem," a
machine operated to some extent by the patron himself. That the doc-
trine could be applied to the use of the "Dodgem" and not to the use
of the "Bug," is entirely conceivable. In fact, a parallel situation exists.
in New Jersey where the court approved the doctrine as applicable in a
case involving a "Dodgem," Gardner v. G. Howard Mitchell, Inc.,
supra, but refused to recognize it in a case involving the "Virginia Reel,"
a device similar to the one in the principal case. Schnoor v. Palisades
Realty & Amusement Co., 112 N.J.L. 5o6, 172 Adt. 43 (1934).
Reasoning thus, it may be that the majority opinion in the principal case
can be reconciled with the Myers case.
WILLIAM L. ANDERSON
TORTS
GUEST STATUTE - WHO IS A GUEST?
The deceased was fatally injured while riding in a car owned and
operated by the defendant. He was invited to get into the car for the
sole purpose of pointing out to the driver the location of a house a short
distance away. In an action for negligence brought by the plaintiff, as
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the common pleas court
submitted to the jury the question of whether the deceased was a guest.
The court of appeals reversed the resulting judgment for the plaintiff
on the ground that it was manifestly against the weight of the evidence,
but refused to enter final judgment for the defendant. The Supreme
Court affirmed this ruling and remanded the cause for a new trial,
holding that the deceased was not a guest within the meaning of Ohio
G. C. sec 63o8-6, which reads as follows: "The owner, operator, or
person responsible for the operation of a motor vehicle shall not be
liable for loss or damage arising from injuries to or death of a guest
